Your essay should address what living is from the perspective of at least three individuals
introduced in class. Kubler-Ross, Plato and buddha . Be sure to answer who,
what, where and when for each of them. Who are they? What did they say about living? Where
did they say this, in what work? Give examples. When did this take place?
Sample Solution
interested natures completely. Although Binmoreâs work drew heavily from some of Rawls concepts, I find Binmore more realistic in his discussion of social contracts than Rawls is. Amongst the many reviewers of Binmoreâs Natural Justice, Sillari (2008) stated that a possible objection to Binmoreâs belief in reciprocal altruism could be that this belief presumes all members of a society to be contributing members to the society. However, Binmore already addressed this critic by saying that âa) tree or an unborn human is powerless, and so canât be a player in the game of life. Animals, babies, the senile, and the mentally ill are only marginally less helpless, and hence equally unable to take on duties. They are correspondingly unable to exercise any rights under the social contractâ (p. 97). However, this is not the only criticism that Sillari has in mind for Binmore. Sillariâs main disagreement with Natural Justice is âthe role that common knowledge plays in conventions and, by extension, in his naturalistic theory of justiceâ (2008 p. 294). Sillari believes that in Natural Justice, Binmore altogether disregards the role of common knowledge in human societies. Another critic of Binmoreâs 2005 work is Herbert Gintis. While Gintis thinks that Natural Justice is a profound attempt at applying mathematical and economic theories to understanding Justice in human societies, he does not agree with Binmore that moral values can be used empirically as solutions to the Nash bargaining problem. Gintis believes that Binmore went too far carrying out his explanations of social reforms in an analytical economic perspective. He argues that if Binmoreâs theory of humans being self-regarding individuals who are yet capable of committing altruism to hold true, then it is ironic that Binmore is using a very structured repeated game theory to design social contracts that could control the behaviors of a large group of such unpredictable creatures (2006). Gintis instead argues that âhuman beings are emotionally constituted, by virtue of their evolutionary history, to embrace prosocial and altruistic notions of in-groupâout-group identification and reciprocityâ instead of being completely self-regarding creatures as Binmore suggests (2006). There are also some critics to Binmoreâs Natural Justice that brought the attention of Ken Binmore to address their comments at a symposium organized around discussing the 2005 work. The critics Binmore chose to discuss are as follows: de Jasay, Riley, Hardin, Birnbacher, Lahno, Peter, Schmidt-Petri, Cushman, Young, and Hauser, Skyrms, North, Ahlert, and Kliemt. Surprisin>
interested natures completely. Although Binmoreâs work drew heavily from some of Rawls concepts, I find Binmore more realistic in his discussion of social contracts than Rawls is. Amongst the many reviewers of Binmoreâs Natural Justice, Sillari (2008) stated that a possible objection to Binmoreâs belief in reciprocal altruism could be that this belief presumes all members of a society to be contributing members to the society. However, Binmore already addressed this critic by saying that âa) tree or an unborn human is powerless, and so canât be a player in the game of life. Animals, babies, the senile, and the mentally ill are only marginally less helpless, and hence equally unable to take on duties. They are correspondingly unable to exercise any rights under the social contractâ (p. 97). However, this is not the only criticism that Sillari has in mind for Binmore. Sillariâs main disagreement with Natural Justice is âthe role that common knowledge plays in conventions and, by extension, in his naturalistic theory of justiceâ (2008 p. 294). Sillari believes that in Natural Justice, Binmore altogether disregards the role of common knowledge in human societies. Another critic of Binmoreâs 2005 work is Herbert Gintis. While Gintis thinks that Natural Justice is a profound attempt at applying mathematical and economic theories to understanding Justice in human societies, he does not agree with Binmore that moral values can be used empirically as solutions to the Nash bargaining problem. Gintis believes that Binmore went too far carrying out his explanations of social reforms in an analytical economic perspective. He argues that if Binmoreâs theory of humans being self-regarding individuals who are yet capable of committing altruism to hold true, then it is ironic that Binmore is using a very structured repeated game theory to design social contracts that could control the behaviors of a large group of such unpredictable creatures (2006). Gintis instead argues that âhuman beings are emotionally constituted, by virtue of their evolutionary history, to embrace prosocial and altruistic notions of in-groupâout-group identification and reciprocityâ instead of being completely self-regarding creatures as Binmore suggests (2006). There are also some critics to Binmoreâs Natural Justice that brought the attention of Ken Binmore to address their comments at a symposium organized around discussing the 2005 work. The critics Binmore chose to discuss are as follows: de Jasay, Riley, Hardin, Birnbacher, Lahno, Peter, Schmidt-Petri, Cushman, Young, and Hauser, Skyrms, North, Ahlert, and Kliemt. Surprisin>
