- What is the relationship between Rules 401 and 403?
- What appears to have been the intent behind Rule 403? Does the way in which it is worded tell you anything about its intended purpose? If so, how?
- A’s lawyer offers a piece of evidence. B’s lawyer objects, citing Rule 403 and urging that the evidence must be excluded because it “prejudices” B. Will this claim, by itself, result in an order sustaining B’s objection and excluding the evidence in question? Why/why not?
- Find and read three cases that address Rule 403. Each case has to have been decided by either a federal circuit court, the Arizona Supreme Court, or the Arizona Court of Appeals.
- Cite the cases. In discussing each case, talk enough about the underlying facts enough to illuminate the “403” issue. What does the case tell you about how Rule 403 should be interpreted and applied? Do you agree with the Court’s conclusion(s) about Rule 403? Why/why not?
Sample Solution
or, undefinable. Therefore, any claim which gives a definition of âgoodnessâ is attributing goodness to something, rather than identifying what goodness itself, as a property, is. Moore accuses those who make this error of committing the ânaturalistic fallacyâ. He believes that moral naturalists â philosophers who maintain that moral properties exist and can be objectively studied, through biology and sciences â are primarily responsible for this mistake. Moore thought philosophers committed the naturalistic fallacy when attempting to define âgoodâ by moving from one claim that a thing is âgoodâ to the claim that âgoodâ is that thing. Moore thought one could not identify âgoodâ with a thing one believes is âgoodâ. In order to test and determine whether an attempt at defining âgoodâ is correct and not a concealed assignment is what Moore called the âopen question argument.â Moore proposed that if âgoodnessâ is a natural property, then there is some correct explanation of which natural property it is. For example, maybe âgoodnessâ is the same property as âpleasantnessâ, or the same property as being âdesirableâ. Further, a correct property must be identified to fill in an identity statement of the form âgoodness = __________â, or, âwhat is good is _________â. This kind of identity statement can be correct only if both terms on either side of the identity sign are synonyms for proficient speakers who understand both terms. Synonymy of the two terms is then tested through substitution of a term. Mooreâs idea is that substitution of synonyms for one another preserves the original proposition that a sentence expresses. For example, using the sentence: âwhat is good is pleasant.â For this to pass Mooreâs test, the sentence would have to express the same thing as âwhat is pleasant is pleasant.â Moore believed it was obvious that these two sentences do not express the same proposition. In thinking that what is good is pleasant, Moore thought one is not only thinking that what is pleasant is pleasant. According to Moore, there is an âopen questionâ as to whether what is good is pleasant, and it can be understood when someone doubts the generated statement. However, there is no âopen questionâ as to whether what is pleasant is pleasant, because this analytic truth cannot be doubted. Therefore, Moore thought that no substitution will pas>
or, undefinable. Therefore, any claim which gives a definition of âgoodnessâ is attributing goodness to something, rather than identifying what goodness itself, as a property, is. Moore accuses those who make this error of committing the ânaturalistic fallacyâ. He believes that moral naturalists â philosophers who maintain that moral properties exist and can be objectively studied, through biology and sciences â are primarily responsible for this mistake. Moore thought philosophers committed the naturalistic fallacy when attempting to define âgoodâ by moving from one claim that a thing is âgoodâ to the claim that âgoodâ is that thing. Moore thought one could not identify âgoodâ with a thing one believes is âgoodâ. In order to test and determine whether an attempt at defining âgoodâ is correct and not a concealed assignment is what Moore called the âopen question argument.â Moore proposed that if âgoodnessâ is a natural property, then there is some correct explanation of which natural property it is. For example, maybe âgoodnessâ is the same property as âpleasantnessâ, or the same property as being âdesirableâ. Further, a correct property must be identified to fill in an identity statement of the form âgoodness = __________â, or, âwhat is good is _________â. This kind of identity statement can be correct only if both terms on either side of the identity sign are synonyms for proficient speakers who understand both terms. Synonymy of the two terms is then tested through substitution of a term. Mooreâs idea is that substitution of synonyms for one another preserves the original proposition that a sentence expresses. For example, using the sentence: âwhat is good is pleasant.â For this to pass Mooreâs test, the sentence would have to express the same thing as âwhat is pleasant is pleasant.â Moore believed it was obvious that these two sentences do not express the same proposition. In thinking that what is good is pleasant, Moore thought one is not only thinking that what is pleasant is pleasant. According to Moore, there is an âopen questionâ as to whether what is good is pleasant, and it can be understood when someone doubts the generated statement. However, there is no âopen questionâ as to whether what is pleasant is pleasant, because this analytic truth cannot be doubted. Therefore, Moore thought that no substitution will pas>