Historical fiction is defined as movies and novels in which a story is made up but is set in the past and borrows true characteristics of the time period in which it is set[1]. In other words, it is fiction (make believe) that is set, uses, compares, or takes place in history.
Some well-known examples of historical fiction include: Gone With the Wind, To Kill a Mockingbird, The Three Musketeers, Titanic and The Hunchback of Notre Dame.
Sample Solution
he believes that the body can be disassembled then put back together and remain the same body as long as it picks up just where it left off. According to Hershenov, the doctrine of resurrection only worries us because we see corpses being destroyed. However, we can tolerate âgappyâ (Hershenov,2003,26) existence for identity as long as we are made of the same stuff. To illustrate, he presents some thought experiments. To initially exemplify, he provides the analogy of a gun, which can be disassembled into separate parts and then reassembled by the owner after a period of time. Hershenov thinks that our intuitions would sustain that the recently reassembled gun is the same gun as the before disassembled gun. Due to these intuitions, the gaps in the entityâs existence cannot pose as a threat to identity claims. (Hershenov,2003,26) To further illustrate our intuitions, he asks us to conceive of an invitro fertilisation lab. In the actual world (W1) on January 25th, 1998 at midday X was fertilized in a petri dish. The idea is, could it have been the case that in World 2 (W2) X was fertilized instead at 1pm? Our intuitions are supposed to think sure why not, if we hold everything constant then it could have equally turned out to be X. So, the same X that might have originated at midday in W1 could have come into existence at 1pm in W2. Now in World 3 (W3) the embryo X is indeed created at midday, it is exactly the same as in the actual world. However, the embryo then is destroyed in an instance after it was created. For instance, the petri dish is dropped. The lab technician then reassembles the stuff back together and does the process again at 1pm like in W2. In this case, can this still be the embryo that becomes X. We are supposed think yes. If our intuitions say yes, then it is proven that identity can tolerate a gap in existence and destruction of the thing. (Hershenov,2003,30) Hershenov argues that if we agree with the above case, this is equally what resurrection is like. If we think the petri dish case is acceptable and we still get X in World 3 then we have already accepted that the thing can be destroyed, have a gap in its existence, be reassembled back into existence and still be the same thing. This case maps onto resurrection, if we can tolerate destruction in the petri dish cases then there is no problem of resurrection after all. (Hershenov,2003,30) Whatâs important for Hershenov, is that identity is secured by individuals constituting the same matter. As long as you have secured the matter that constitutes you, then you can have resurrection. I will now present how Hershenovâs identity claim leads to a greater issue. If we conceive of two individuals, letâs say one is a cannibal and the other the cannibalâs victim. They seem to be composed of the same matter. At their parallel deaths, how can God resurrect the both of them since the matter they are composed of seems to have two equal candidates for it? It would appear that God would not be able to resurrect both of the individuals. This much greater issue presents itself in the cannibal case. The issue is that the nature of resurrection requires that many different individualâs matter will be comprised in multiple bodies so inevitably it will be in multiple places at once. This poses a serious threat to Hershenovâs model as how would an individualâs identity be secured if theyâre made up of multip>
he believes that the body can be disassembled then put back together and remain the same body as long as it picks up just where it left off. According to Hershenov, the doctrine of resurrection only worries us because we see corpses being destroyed. However, we can tolerate âgappyâ (Hershenov,2003,26) existence for identity as long as we are made of the same stuff. To illustrate, he presents some thought experiments. To initially exemplify, he provides the analogy of a gun, which can be disassembled into separate parts and then reassembled by the owner after a period of time. Hershenov thinks that our intuitions would sustain that the recently reassembled gun is the same gun as the before disassembled gun. Due to these intuitions, the gaps in the entityâs existence cannot pose as a threat to identity claims. (Hershenov,2003,26) To further illustrate our intuitions, he asks us to conceive of an invitro fertilisation lab. In the actual world (W1) on January 25th, 1998 at midday X was fertilized in a petri dish. The idea is, could it have been the case that in World 2 (W2) X was fertilized instead at 1pm? Our intuitions are supposed to think sure why not, if we hold everything constant then it could have equally turned out to be X. So, the same X that might have originated at midday in W1 could have come into existence at 1pm in W2. Now in World 3 (W3) the embryo X is indeed created at midday, it is exactly the same as in the actual world. However, the embryo then is destroyed in an instance after it was created. For instance, the petri dish is dropped. The lab technician then reassembles the stuff back together and does the process again at 1pm like in W2. In this case, can this still be the embryo that becomes X. We are supposed think yes. If our intuitions say yes, then it is proven that identity can tolerate a gap in existence and destruction of the thing. (Hershenov,2003,30) Hershenov argues that if we agree with the above case, this is equally what resurrection is like. If we think the petri dish case is acceptable and we still get X in World 3 then we have already accepted that the thing can be destroyed, have a gap in its existence, be reassembled back into existence and still be the same thing. This case maps onto resurrection, if we can tolerate destruction in the petri dish cases then there is no problem of resurrection after all. (Hershenov,2003,30) Whatâs important for Hershenov, is that identity is secured by individuals constituting the same matter. As long as you have secured the matter that constitutes you, then you can have resurrection. I will now present how Hershenovâs identity claim leads to a greater issue. If we conceive of two individuals, letâs say one is a cannibal and the other the cannibalâs victim. They seem to be composed of the same matter. At their parallel deaths, how can God resurrect the both of them since the matter they are composed of seems to have two equal candidates for it? It would appear that God would not be able to resurrect both of the individuals. This much greater issue presents itself in the cannibal case. The issue is that the nature of resurrection requires that many different individualâs matter will be comprised in multiple bodies so inevitably it will be in multiple places at once. This poses a serious threat to Hershenovâs model as how would an individualâs identity be secured if theyâre made up of multip>
