Said and Huntington Debate over the âclass of civilizationâ argument
write 5 paragraphs comparing the arguments of Samuel Huntington and Edward Said.
watch the Huntington interview on Charlie Rose where he describes his âclass of civilizationsâ argument. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3SNicJRcUqs
Biography of Samuel Huntington: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Samuel-P-Huntington
familiarize yourself with the information presented in this biograph because it will help you read his argument.
watch the Edward Said Lecture on the âclash of civilizations.â https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qkK4pApcwMc
Biography of Edward Said: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Said
watch both interviews and discuss the two arguments. This is a comparative paper. You are to compare the two arguments and present which is
In paragraph one: State both Huntington and Saidâs argument. (a big part of your grade will be determined by how well you understand the arguments)
In paragraphs two-four: offer evidence from the interviews to show that you understand the arguments.
Sample Solution
The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, therule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintainingitself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule. . . The sovereign decision of the exception is the originaryjuridico-political structure (struttura) on the basis of which what isincluded in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquiretheir meaning Is this anarchy? For if it was, then Schmitt would be arguing forreplacing the Weimar republic with a state no better than the state ofnature. This is not the case. For Schmitt (1963:12): What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority,which means the suspension of the entire existing order⦠Because theexception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristicsense still prevails, even if it is not of the ordinary kind. Schmitt is keen to maintain a constant relation between the state ofexception and the state of law. It is still the law that suspendsitself through the figure of the sovereign. For Schmitt, it is thisdecision that is at the heart of sovereignty. Rather than sovereigntybeing a matter for popular will, Schmitt understands that underlyingthe founding of any law is a moment where law must be suspended. Thismoment returns in the state of exception. This state of exceptionguarantees the power of the sovereign. It also reveals that sovereigntyis pure immediacy, rather than representation (which is the makingpresent of something which is absent). As Schmitt notes of thesovereign decision (1985b: 31): âthe decision becomes instantlyindependent of argumentative substantiation and received autonomousvalue.â This argument, Schmitt claims, understands the true power oflaw in a way rationalist jurisprudence fails to do. We see that Schmitt argument about the decision versus the rule is nota new concept in his thought in the 1920âs. The similarity betweenthese statements and those in Law and Judgement indicate this projecthad been there from the very start. In the Political Theology he givesa good definition of his project: (ibid: 22): âprecisely a philosophyof concrete life must not withdraw from the exception and the extremecase, but must be interested in it to the highest degree.â Through thisproject Schmitt attempts to break out of the choice between nihilisticindividualism (the bureaucratic state) and community based politics(communism, as well as regimes based on tradition) by emphasising thesingularity of >
The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, therule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintainingitself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule. . . The sovereign decision of the exception is the originaryjuridico-political structure (struttura) on the basis of which what isincluded in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquiretheir meaning Is this anarchy? For if it was, then Schmitt would be arguing forreplacing the Weimar republic with a state no better than the state ofnature. This is not the case. For Schmitt (1963:12): What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority,which means the suspension of the entire existing order⦠Because theexception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristicsense still prevails, even if it is not of the ordinary kind. Schmitt is keen to maintain a constant relation between the state ofexception and the state of law. It is still the law that suspendsitself through the figure of the sovereign. For Schmitt, it is thisdecision that is at the heart of sovereignty. Rather than sovereigntybeing a matter for popular will, Schmitt understands that underlyingthe founding of any law is a moment where law must be suspended. Thismoment returns in the state of exception. This state of exceptionguarantees the power of the sovereign. It also reveals that sovereigntyis pure immediacy, rather than representation (which is the makingpresent of something which is absent). As Schmitt notes of thesovereign decision (1985b: 31): âthe decision becomes instantlyindependent of argumentative substantiation and received autonomousvalue.â This argument, Schmitt claims, understands the true power oflaw in a way rationalist jurisprudence fails to do. We see that Schmitt argument about the decision versus the rule is nota new concept in his thought in the 1920âs. The similarity betweenthese statements and those in Law and Judgement indicate this projecthad been there from the very start. In the Political Theology he givesa good definition of his project: (ibid: 22): âprecisely a philosophyof concrete life must not withdraw from the exception and the extremecase, but must be interested in it to the highest degree.â Through thisproject Schmitt attempts to break out of the choice between nihilisticindividualism (the bureaucratic state) and community based politics(communism, as well as regimes based on tradition) by emphasising thesingularity of >
